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Owen Fiss*
In recent decades, many changes have occurred in our system of communi-
cation, some quite startling, and yet the telephone continues to be an important
part of that system. It is the means that enables us to have conversations with
friends, family, and business associates increasingly located at a distance. Ad-
mittedly, many of the exchanges that once took place on the telephone now oc-
cur through e-mails, especially when the purpose is to convey information, is-
sue a directive, or render an opinion. We still turn to the telephone, however,
when a conversation is needed, for the transmission of the human voice permits
direct, highly interactive, and sometimes spontaneous engagement with others.
The conversational capacity of the telephone has been enhanced by recent
technological advances that permit transmission of the images as well as the
voices of the parties to a conversation. Moreover, thanks to the advent of the
cell phone, it has become more convenient to place or receive a telephone call.
For most of the twentieth century, the telephone was a stationary device located
in the home or office or in publicly accessible phone booths. Today the tele-
phone is mobile and can be easily carried wherever one happens to be.
Engaging in a personal conversation is not like writing a diary. We may as-
sume that the thoughts or sentiments expressed in the conversation remain
with the person with whom we are speaking, but that assumption may well be
mistaken. This is so even in a face-to-face encounter. The person with whom we
are speaking may turn around and share the contents of that conversation with
others-in fact he or she may be secretly recording the conversation for that
very purpose. Although such a risk is present in a conversation conducted over
the phone, this mode of communication presents yet another threat to the pri-
vacy of a conversation, and it derives from the fact that the conversation is be-
ing electronically transmitted. A third party may obtain access to that transmis-
sion, listen in, and record whatever is said.
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In the twentieth century, as the telephone became ubiquitous and tele-
phone conversations became more commonplace, the law increasingly sought
to guard against the dangers of such interceptions by a third party (which, due
to the technology initially employed to transmit telephone signals, became
known as "wiretapping"). Starting in 1934, Congress prohibited private parties
from ever wiretapping.' Although there was a question whether government
officials were covered by this law,' in 1967 the Supreme Court construed the
Fourth Amendment to limit the authority of federal officials to eavesdrop in
this way, requiring them to go before a judge and obtain a warrant authorizing
the interception.'
The statutory prohibition against wiretapping by private parties remains
unqualified and appears today as a fixed feature of the legal landscape. Yet the
constitutional rule protecting the privacy of telephone conversations from gov-
ernment interceptions is now in shambles. This turn of events is in part attri-
butable to the reluctance of the Supreme Court to fully and forcefully safeguard
the values protected by the Fourth Amendment. When, in 1967, the Court first
fashioned the rule requiring warrants for wiretapping, it left for another day the
question whether that rule applied to wiretapping designed to protect national
security.4 In 1972, the Court moved toward a resolution of this issue by applying
the warrant requirement to an individual who had been prosecuted for blowing
up a CIA building in Ann Arbor, Michigan.' At the same time, however, the
Court identified another question-whether the rule requiring a warrant ap-
plied to the gathering of foreign intelligence-and left that question unre-
solved.' To this day, forty years later, the Supreme Court has not spoken to this
issue in any direct and obvious way, and has by default allowed full sway to the
political branches to regulate such interceptions.
In 1978, Congress established a comprehensive scheme for the regulation of
wiretapping aimed at the gathering of foreign intelligence.7 Although this
scheme required the executive to obtain the approval of a judge before engaging
in wiretapping, it qualified in important ways the standards governing the is-
1. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, § 605, 48 Stat. 1064, 1103-04 (co-
dified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 605 (2012)).
2. Compare Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 381-83 (1937) (holding that the
Act did cover federal agents), with To Authorize Wire Tapping: Hearings on H.R.
2266 and H.R. 3099 Before Subcomm. No. i of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 77th
Cong. 17-18 (1941) (maintaining that the statute did not prohibit the distribution
within the federal government of the transcript of a wiretap).
3. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
4. Id. at 358 n.23.
5. United States v. U. S. District Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
6. Id. at 309 n.8.
7. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (co-
dified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, and 50 U.S.C. (2012)).
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suance of warrants required under the Fourth Amendment. Moreover, during
the last decade, as the fight against international terrorism achieved greater
momentum and political saliency, these standards were further qualified, and
the power of the executive to intercept telephone calls was vastly enlarged.
The enlargement of the power of surveillance began with an executive order
issued in the fall of 2001, shortly after the terrorist attacks of September ii, but
culminated in a statute-enacted first in 20078 and then again in 2oo8.9 This
statute severed the analytic connection between international terrorism and
wiretapping and justified such surveillance as a form of foreign intelligence ga-
thering, which included, but was not limited to, the surveillance of persons sus-
pected of international terrorism directed against the United States. Presented
as an amendment to the 1978 scheme, the 2008 statute retained the original re-
quirement of court approval but significantly lowered-almost to a vanishing
point-the standards for obtaining that approval for international telephone
calls between persons in the United States and foreigners abroad.
The Supreme Court is now considering, in a suit to enjoin the implementa-
tion of the 2008 statute, whether anyone might have standing to challenge it."o
In this Essay, I go beyond the standing issue and address the substantive dan-
gers posed by the 2008 statute-and, for that matter, the 1978 scheme in gener-
al-to the values protected by the Fourth Amendment. Wiretapping interferes
with the exercise of personal liberties essential for democratic life and thus, even
in this time of terror, should be subject to the warrant requirement long proc-
laimed by the Supreme Court. In the wake of September ii, the temptation will
of course be great to allow an exception to the warrant requirement for extraor-
dinary crimes. I explain why that temptation should be resisted and why, even if
an exception were allowed, the grant of authority in the 2008 statute should be
declared invalid under the doctrine that condemns overbroad interferences
with freedom.
I. THE WAR ON TERROR AND THE ENACTMENT OF THE 2008 FISA AMEND-
MENTS
Soon after the September ii attacks, President George W. Bush declared a
"War on Terror" and gave concrete meaning to that declaration by launching a
military campaign against al Qaeda, the far-flung terrorist organization that was
responsible for those attacks. He also invaded Afghanistan when that govern-
ment, then controlled by the Taliban, refused to turn over Osama bin Laden
and other leaders of al Qaeda who were then harbored there.
8. Protect America Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-55, 121 Stat. 552 (codified in scattered
sections of So U.S.C. (2012)).
9. FISA Amendments Act of 20o8, Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2474 (codified at 50
U.S.C. § 188ia (2012)).
io. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 132 S. Ct. 2431 (2012) (granting certiorari).
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In the context of this military campaign, President Bush issued a number of
directives as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. The most notorious of
these orders governed the treatment of persons captured on the battlefield. He
determined that persons who fought on behalf of al Qaeda or Afghanistan were
"illegal enemy combatants" and thus beyond the protection of the Third Gene-
va Convention." President Bush decreed that some of these individuals were to
be subject to trial before military commissions and others were to be held for
prolonged, indefinite periods-until hostilities ceased-without being afforded
a trial of any type. He also established, in January 2002, a prison at Guantinamo
Naval Station for these very purposes.
President Bush's orders were not, however, confined to the distant battle-
field or those captured on it. Some of his orders had a direct and immediate
impact on the quality of life in the United States, though they, too, were issued
pursuant to his powers as Commander-in-Chief. One of the most striking, is-
sued in the fall of 2001, established the so-called "Terrorist Surveillance Pro-
gram" (TSP), which directed the National Security Agency to tap international
telephone calls between persons in the United States and persons abroad who
were suspected of having links to al Qaeda or associated forces. The intercep-
tion of these calls was not authorized by a warrant or any other form of judicial
approval.
At its inception the Terrorist Surveillance Program was hidden from public
view, which, given that its purpose was to catch the unwary, is not all that sur-
prising. On December 15, 2005, however, four years after it was instituted, the
program was publicly disclosed by the New York Times" and soon became the
subject of a heated public controversy. Although many objections were raised to
the program, the principal one arose from the failure of the President to abide
by the requirements of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). "
FISA was adopted by Congress in 1978 in the wake of the revelations of a
Senate committee, headed by Senator Frank Church, about the far-reaching and
largely uncontrolled surveillance activities of American intelligence agencies. As
originally enacted, the statute required the executive to obtain permission or
authorization from a special court-the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court-before tapping the phones of agents or employees of a foreign power.
The statute decreed that the membership of the court was to consist of eleven
sitting federal judges specially designated for this assignment by the Chief Jus-
ni. See, e.g., Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Cer-
tain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,883 (defining "il-
legal enemy combatants" while avoiding the phrase).
12. James Risen & Eric Lichtblaue, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2oo5/12/16/politics/16program
.html (correction appended).
13. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (co-
dified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, and 50 U.S.C. (2012)).
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tice of the United States.' 4 Each was authorized to act alone. Both their identi-
ties and their proceedings were to be kept secret." The 1978 statute defined a
foreign power to include not only a foreign nation, but also a "group engaged in
international terrorism." 6 The statute further provided that foreign intelligence
information included information relating to "clandestine intelligence activi-
ties," "sabotage," "international terrorism," and "the conduct of the foreign af-
fairs of the United States."' 7 The Act declared that the procedures that it estab-
lished were to be the exclusive avenue for gathering electronic foreign
intelligence."
Bush's Attorney General, Alberto Gonzalez, defended the President's re-
fusal to abide by the procedures of the 1978 statute.' 9 Gonzalez claimed that the
September 18, 2001 congressional resolution authorizing the use of military
force against those responsible for the September 11 attacks had implicitly mod-
ified the provision of the 1978 statute that made it the exclusive procedure for
intercepting the telephone calls of the agents of a foreign power. In Gonzalez's
view, the 2001 resolution had removed any conflict between the Terrorist Sur-
veillance Program and the 1978 FISA statute.20
Gonzalez did not stop there. He also denied that Congress had the power to
interfere with the effort of the President to discharge his duties as Commander
-in-Chief. Article II of the Constitution vests the President with the authority
and responsibility to act as Commander-in-Chief and he thus has, according to
Gonzalez, the authority-the constitutional authority-to override the provi-
sions of any statute that, in his judgment, unduly interfere with the discharge of
these duties. Congress cannot tell the President how to deploy the armed forces,
and similarly, Gonzalez continued, Congress cannot instruct the President in
14. 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a) (2012).
15. Provision was also made for review of the decisions of individual judges by a spe-
cially designated three-judge appellate court. Given the secretive nature of the
FISA proceedings, this right of review was available only to the government. Id.
§ 1803(b).
16. Id. § 18o(a)(4).
17. Id. § 180(e).
18. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(f) (2012).
19. See Wartime Executive Power and the National Security Agency's Surveillance Au-
thority: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 1o9th Cong. 10-15 (2006),
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/search/pagedetails.action?granuleld=CHRG
-lo9shrg27443&packageld=CHRG-logshrg27443-
20. Id. at 13-14 (arguing that the 20o resolution "must permit electronic surveillance
of those associated with al Qaeda").
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his efforts to gather intelligence needed for the successful completion of the
military campaign against al Qaeda and its allies.2 1
This argument was part of a larger strategy of the Administration, spear-
headed by Vice President Dick Cheney and his chief assistant, David Adding-
ton, to enlarge-or, in their view, recover-the constitutional prerogatives of
the President to act on his own. In fact, the Administration's position on the
Terrorist Surveillance Program paralleled the position it had taken on the me-
thods that were to be used in interrogating suspected terrorists or persons ac-
cused of having links to al Qaeda. A 2002 memorandum of the Office of Legal
Counsel in the Department of Justice, obviously prepared with an eye to telling
the President what he wanted to hear, declared that the President could not be
constrained in his choice of the methods of interrogating enemy combatants by
the statute that had been passed by Congress in 1988 to implement the Conven-
tion against Torture.2 Much of this memorandum, specifically the contrived
effort to limit the reach of the statute by narrowing the definition of torture,
was subsequently repudiated in December 2004 by the Department itself, once
the earlier memorandum became public.23 This new memorandum did not,
however, repudiate the portion of that earlier one that denied Congress the au-
thority to limit the power of the President, acting as Commander-in-Chief, to
choose the methods to be used for interrogating suspected terrorists. The me-
morandum simply said that it was unnecessary to address the issue since the
President had declared that he was opposed to torture.
The President did not hide behind these departmental memoranda to de-
fine the scope of his authority to interrogate suspected terrorists. In signing the
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005>24 he claimed for himself the right to act unila-
terally in conducting the War on Terror, even to the point of overriding Con-
gress. In his signing statement, the President put into doubt the efficacy of the
ban on torture that, thanks to the campaign of Senator John McCain, was made
a part of that measure. Bush underscored the failure of the McCain addition to
provide a remedy to enforce this ban on torture and, even more importantly,
Bush declared that he would not let this statutory ban interfere with the proper
discharge of his duties as Commander-in-Chief. 2 He issued the statement on
21. Id. at 12 ("The[] inherent authorities vested in the President by the Constitution
include the power to spy on enemies like al Qaeda without prior approval from
other branches of Government.").
22. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Coun-
sel, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President (Aug. 1, 2002), http://www
.justice.gov/olc/docs/memo-gonzales-augi.pdf (prepared by John C. Yoo).
23. See Memorandum from Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of
Legal Counsel, to James B. Comey, Deputy Attorney Gen. (Dec. 30, 2004),
http://www.thetorturedatabase.org/files/foia subsite/pdfs/DOJOLCoolo9.pdf
24. 42 U.S.C. § 20oodd (2012).
25. President George W. Bush, Statement on Signing the Department of Defense,
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations To Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of
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December 30, 2005, soon after the New York Times had disclosed the existence
of the TSP wiretapping program. This coincidence lent further prominence to
the Attorney General's argument that, notwithstanding the purported conflict
with the 1978 FISA statute, the TSP wiretapping decree constituted a lawful ex-
ercise of the President's power as Commander-in-Chief.
On the issue of wiretapping, it is not clear who had the better of the argu-
ment in resolving the conflict between the President and Congress. Article II,
which enumerates the powers of the President, does say that he is Commander
-in-Chief of the armed forces, but the Constitution also grants Congress war
powers. Article I gives Congress the authority to declare war, make general
regulations governing the armed forces, and appropriate the funds for the mili-
tary. In the domain of war, many of the powers of the President and Congress
are shared or overlapping and each branch can advance a claim for primacy
when there is a conflict. The President speaks for the nation. Senators and Con-
gressmen are more likely to feel the pull of the local constituencies that elect
them, though those local ties may well enhance their accountability to electors
and thus strengthen their authority to speak on behalf of the people.
Those who disputed the expansive conception of executive power embo-
died in the TSP wiretapping program made frequent reference to Justice Jack-
son's concurring opinion in the 1952 Youngstown decision.26 In that case, the
Court set aside President Truman's seizure of the steel mills, which, according
to Truman, was necessary to prevent a strike by organized labor that would
otherwise interfere with the United States' military effort in the Korean War.
The majority opinion in Youngstown, written by Justice Black, held that the sei-
zure constituted an act of lawmaking, a power belonging to Congress, and thus
could not be seen as a proper exercise of the President's power as
Commander-in-Chief. 21
Justice Jackson concurred in the result, but introduced a more pragmatic
scheme for defining the limits on the President's power. That power, he said,
varied according to its relation to the exercise of congressional power and was
at the lowest ebb when it was in conflict with an explicit statutory command.
Such a pragmatic approach did not, however, fully resolve the dispute between
the President and Congress over the Terrorist Surveillance Program, so differ-
Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006 (Dec. 30, 2005), available at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?%20pid=65259 (declaring that
"[t]he executive branch shall construe" the prohibition "in a manner consistent
with the constitutional authority of the President to supervise the unitary execu-
tive branch and as Commander in Chief and consistent with the constitutional
limitations on the judicial power" in order to "protect[] the American people
from further terrorist attacks").
26. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634-55 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring).
27. Id. at 588-89 (with majority opinion).
28. Id. at 635-38 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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ent in many respects from the seizure of steel mills. The President's power may
indeed be at its weakest when it is in conflict with a statute, but Justice Jackson
was careful not to deny the power of the President even under these circum-
stances if, as Gonzalez maintained, it lies within the constitutional grant of
power to the President as Commander-in-Chief.
In the end, the nation was saved from the difficulties inherent in resolving
the conflict between the President and Congress. In January 2007, after a year-
long public debate about the Terrorist Surveillance Program, the Attorney Gen-
eral changed his strategy. He turned to the FISA court and got what he wanted.
In a letter to the Chairman and ranking minority member of the Senate Judi-
ciary Committee, the Attorney General reported that on January 1o, 2007, a
judge on the FISA court had issued orders-arguably ones that might be
characterized as "blanket" orders-authorizing the wiretapping covered by the
Terrorist Surveillance Program. 9 As Gonzalez put it, a FISA judge had issued
"orders authorizing the Government to target for collection international
communications into or out of the United States where there is probable cause
to believe that one of the communicants is a member or agent of al Qaeda."30
The Attorney General also said that in light of this turn of events, the President
had determined that there was no need to continue the Terrorist Surveillance
Program, although the Attorney General affirmed his belief that the program
"fully complies with the law."I'
Factions within the Administration soon grew uneasy with this newly an-
nounced willingness of the Attorney General to submit to the requirements of
FISA. Some objected to the scope of FISA, which had been construed to cover
any communication routed through the United States, even telephone calls be-
tween two foreigners located abroad." Others objected to the need to obtain
court approval when people in the United States were parties to the conversa-
tion though the target of the interception was a foreigner located abroad.33 Still
29. 153 CONG. REC. 1380-81 (2007).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1381.
32. Your World with Neil Cavuto (Fox News television broadcast July 31, 2007) (tran-
script available at http://www.foxnews.com/story/,2933,291763,oo.html#ixzZ22
U84w38c (quoting John Boehner's understanding that, according to a judge, FISA
"prohibit[ed] the ability of our intelligence services and our counterintelligence
people from listening in to two terrorists in other parts of the world where the
communication could come through the United States"); see also Mark Hosen-
ball, An 'Intel Gap': What We're Missing, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 6, 2007, at 9 ("[I]ntel-
collection officials concluded that FISA court authorizations should be obtained
to eavesdrop not just on messages where at least one party is inside the country,
but also for eavesdropping on messages between two parties overseas that pass
through U.S. communications gear.").
33. Greg Miller, New Limits Put on Overseas Surveillance, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2007,
http://articles.latimes.com/2007/aug/o2/nation/na-spying2 (quoting officials con-
firming that FISA affected cases "'where one end is foreign and you don't know
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others were troubled by a decision by another FISA judge, who in March 2007,
when considering a renewal of the original January io orders, took the view that
applications for authorization to wiretap under FISA had to be made on a par-
ticularized or person-to-person basis. 4 On April 13, 2007, only months after
Gonzalez's compliant letter to the Senate Judiciary Committee, the Administra-
tion gave expression to this backlash and introduced legislation that would
modernize FISA-or, put otherwise, give the intelligence agencies all the power
they thought they needed."
Congress responded favorably to the Administration's overtures, first on
August 5, 2007, when it passed the Protect America Act.36 That law was con-
ceived as a temporary measure. By its very terms it was scheduled to expire in
six months, and it in fact expired, after a short reprieve, on February 16, 20o8.
On July io, 20o8, Congress enacted the replacement statute.37 It was presented
as an amendment of the 1978 statute, and thus was appropriately named the
FISA Amendments Act of 20o8. It essentially allowed FISA judges to authorize
wiretaps on the terms and conditions proposed by the Administration. This sta-
tute was originally scheduled to expire at the end of 2012, and at that time it was
renewed until 2017-which is more than fifteen years after the Terrorist
Surveillance Program was first instituted.38
II. OBAMA S POSITION ON THE 2008 FISA AMENDMENTS
Although the 2008 statute was sponsored by President Bush and is histori-
cally connected to the Terrorist Surveillance Program he instituted, it has been
endorsed by his successor, President Barack Obama. He signed into law the re-
where the other is'-meaning warrants would be required even when it was un-
clear whether communications were crossing the United States or involved a per-
son in the United States").
34. Joby Warrick & Walter Pincus, How the Fight for Vast New Spying Powers Was
Won, WASH. POST, Aug. 12, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn
/content/article/2007/o8/u/AR2007081101349.html ("The decisions had the imme-
diate practical effect of forcing the NSA to laboriously ask judges on the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court each time it wanted to capture such foreign com-
munications from a wire or fiber on U.S. soil.").
35. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Fact Sheet: Title IV of the Fiscal Year 2008
Intelligence Authorization Act, Matters Related to the Foreign Intelligence Sur-
veillance Act (Apr. 13, 2007), http://www.justice.gov/opalpr/2007/April/o7-nsd
247.html.
36. Protect America Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-155, 121 Stat. 552 (codified at 50
U.S.C. §§ 1801, 1803, 1805 (2012)).
37. FISA Amendments Act of 20o8, Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436 (codified at 50
U.S.C. § 1881a (2012)).
38. FISA Amendments Act Reauthorization Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-238, 126 Stat.
1631 (codified in scattered section ofi8 and 50 U.S.C.).
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newal, but even before that he supported the measure. As a senator, Obama op-
posed a provision of the 2008 statute that gave immunity from civil suits to the
telephone carriers who had participated in the original Terrorist Surveillance
Program by giving the NSA access to their facilities. Obama lost that fight" and
ultimately voted for the 2008 statute.40 His Attorney General, Eric Holder, sub-
sequently declared at his confirmation hearing in January 2009 that he would
defend the constitutionality of the statute.4 ' Soon after the 2008 statute had
been signed into law, a lawsuit challenging it and seeking to enjoin its imple-
mentation was filed, 42 and this suit was pending at the time of Holder's confir-
mation hearing.
Holder's assurance to the senators should be seen not as a grudging recog-
nition of a ministerial duty, but rather as the expression of the broad policy po-
sition of the Obama Administration: a willingness-perhaps a reluctant wil-
lingness, but still a willingness-to continue most of Bush's counterterrorism
policies. President Obama has studiously and consistently avoided using the
phrase "War on Terror," but he has repeatedly declared that the United States is
at war with al Qaeda. He maintained that position even after Osama bin Laden
was killed in May 2011 during an attack on his compound in Pakistan. Admit-
tedly, on January 22, 2009, the day after his inauguration, Obama issued execu-
tive orders that sought to minimize the risk of torture in the interrogation of
suspected terrorists by imposing the Army Field Manual on the CIA and closing
secret prisons-the "black sites"-that the CIA had maintained.43 He also or-
dered that the prison at Guantdnamo be closed in a year's time.44 Congress has
blocked the implementation of this order, but the significance of the closing
soon became unclear, since in May 2009, in his now-famous National Archives
speech, 45 Obama embraced key Bush policies that gave rise to the notoriety of
the Guantinamo prison, such as prolonged, indefinite detention without trial of
some of the prisoners held there and the use of military commissions to try
some of the others.
39. 154 CONG. REC. 14,378-79 (20o8).
40. Id. at 14,385.
41. Nomination of Eric H. Holder, Jr., Nominee To Be Attorney General of the United
States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, iith Cong. 104 (2009).
42. See Amnesty Int'l USA v. McConnell, 646 F. Supp. 2d 633 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), vacated
638 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. granted 132 S. Ct. 2431 (2012).
43. Exec. Order No. 13,493, Review of Detention Policy Options, 74 Fed. Reg. 4901
(Jan. 22, 2009).
44. Exec. Order No. 13,491, 74 Fed. Reg. 4893 (Jan. 22, 2009); Exec. Order No. 13,492,
74 Fed. Reg. 4897 (Jan. 22, 2009).
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In conducting his War on Terror, President Bush sometimes pursued an
emphatic brand of unilateralism and claimed, as we saw in his defense of the
Terrorist Surveillance Program, the power to act in ways that violated congres-
sional mandates. This stance of Bush has been used to distinguish President
Obama's counterterrorism strategy, but the differences may not be as great as
first appears. Although Bush initially spoke defiantly, he ultimately turned to
Congress, as he did with the 2008 FISA amendments, for the powers he initially
claimed as Commander-in-Chief. Moreover, as Obama's first term drew to a
close and the disagreements with Congress over the closure of Guantinamo
sharpened, he took exception to a provision in the annual defense appropria-
tions bill that limited his powers to transfer prisoners out of Guantdnamo. In a
manner reminiscent of Bush's response to McCain's ban on torture in the De-
tainee Treatment Act of 2005, Obama issued a signing statement in which he
declared that "in the event that these statutory restrictions operate in a manner
that violates constitutional separation of powers principles, my Administration
will implement them in a manner that avoids the constitutional conflict."46 In
defending some of his policies, like targeted killings, Obama often pointed to
the congressional resolution of September 18, 2001, which authorized the use of
force against those responsible for the attacks of September 11. But this practice
does not differentiate him from Bush, who, as we saw, also treated the Septem-
ber 18 resolution as the congressional authorization for the military campaign
he began against al Qaeda and Afghanistan and thus as the foundation for his
exercise of the power of Commander-in-Chief.
At the moment, the Obama Administration is trying to block judicial re-
view of the 2008 surveillance statute by denying that the plaintiffs in the suit
filed immediately after the statute was enacted have standing to challenge it."
The plaintiffs consist of a group of lawyers, journalists, and human rights re-
searchers who have professional interests in the Middle East and who have
regularly been in touch with persons in the region who might be thought to be
terrorists. One of the lawyers represents Khalid Sheik Mohammad, the alleged
46. President Barack Obama, Statement by the President on H.R. 4310 (Jan. 2, 2013),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/01103/statement-president-hr
-4310. In the December 2011 defense appropriations bill, Congress belatedly en-
dorsed the policy of imprisonment without trial and tried to require either trial by
military commission or imprisonment without trial for all foreign nationals being
held as unlawful or unprivileged enemy combatants. National Defense Authoriza-
tion Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, §§ 1021-34, 125 Stat. 1298, 1562-74.
In response to that measure, Obama subsequently issued "waivers" exempting
broad categories of prisoners from the statute's requirements. See Office of the
White House Press Secretary, Presidential Policy Directive-Requirements of the
National Defense Authorization Act, WHITE HousE (Feb. 28, 2012),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/O2/28/presidential-policy
-directive-requirements-national-defense-authorizatio.
47. Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 132 S. Ct. 2431 (2012) (granting certiorari).
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mastermind of the September ii attacks, who is now being tried before a mili-
tary commission at Guantdnamo.48
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found that there was a sub-
stantial risk that the plaintiffs' telephone calls would be intercepted under the
authority of the 2008 statute and that, at the present time, the plaintiffs would
have to adjust their action accordingly to avoid that risk, for example, by speak-
ing in more guarded ways or traveling to the region to have face-to-face conver-
sations with possible witnesses.49 The Second Circuit feared that to insist upon
more-namely, that the plaintiffs show that their telephone calls are in fact be-
ing intercepted or will be intercepted-would, given the secretive nature of such
surveillance, mean that virtually no one would have standing to challenge the
validity of the statute. Although the victim of a tap might be notified of the in-
terception if he or she later became the subject of a criminal prosecution, such
notice would hardly avoid the risk of interception and the harm caused by the
statute to the entire group of plaintiffs. The Administration also pointed to pro-
visions in the 2008 statute that gave telephone companies standing to test its va-
lidity, but once again, the Second Circuit concluded that was not adequate to
protect the distinct interests of the plaintiffs.
At this juncture-arising almost four years after the statute was passed-
one would have assumed that the case would be transferred to the district court
for a ruling on the merits. But Obama sought review of the Second Circuit deci-
sion in the Supreme Court and oral argument was held before the Court this
past October. In this Essay, I put the standing issue to one side and consider in-
stead the validity of the 2008 statute, which the Obama Administration is fully
prepared to defend when, and if, the Supreme Court decides that the plaintiffs
have standing to challenge it.
III. THE ORIGINS OF THE CONCEPT OF "FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE GATHERING"
The 2008 statute is unconnected to warfare. It was enacted during an era
defined by the initiation of a War on Terror, but, unlike the Terrorist Surveil-
lance Program, it has no analytic connection to the fight against al Qaeda or any
other military operation launched in response to the events of September ii. As
an amendment of the 1978 FISA statute, the 20o8 Act is linked, not to war, but
rather to the process governed by that statute-gathering foreign intelligence.
The concept of "foreign intelligence gathering" emerged as a distinct legal
category in a rather odd manner-in the crevices of a back-and-forth between
Congress and the Supreme Court on the rules that should govern wiretapping.
The Supreme Court took the initiative in 1967, during the halcyon days of the
48. See Bill Mears, Supreme Court Hears Arguments on Secret Domestic Surveillance,
CNN.com, Oct. 29, 2012, http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2o12/10/29/supreme
-court-hears-arguments-on-secret-domestic-surveillance.
49. Amnesty Int'l USA v. Clapper, 638 F.3d 118, 139-40 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. granted 132
S. Ct. 2431 (2012).
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Warren Court, when it held in Katz v. United States"o that the Fourth Amend-
ment required government wiretapping to be authorized by a judicial warrant.
In taking this step, the Supreme Court rejected an approach to the Fourth
Amendment, crafted by Chief Justice Taft in the late 1920S in Olmstead v. United
States," which had placed wiretapping beyond the Fourth Amendment on the
theory that it was neither a "search" nor a "seizure." For the Court in Katz,
these two words were not to be treated as Taft imagined-narrow pigeonholes
into which the Court had to fit the contested executive activity. They were part
of the initial phrase of the Amendment ("the right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures"") and this phrase, taken as a whole, should be understood as indica-
tive of a purpose to protect the privacy of ordinary citizens. In the words of Jus-
tice Harlan's concurrence, often thought of as the authoritative gloss on what
the Court had decided in Katz, the applicability of the Fourth Amendment, now
seen in part as a protection of privacy, depends on two conditions: first, a per-
son must "have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and,
second,... the expectation [must] be one that society is prepared to recognize
as 'reasonable.' 53
As a purely technical matter-of no interest to the Court in Katz or, for
that matter, in any of its progeny-the case before the Court did not involve
wiretapping, but something closer to eavesdropping. FBI agents had attached a
listening device to the outside of a public telephone booth. The Court fully ac-
knowledged the limited and circumspect character of the executive's action.
The FBI agents had confined their eavesdropping to only six occasions when the
accused was using the telephone booth and had confined their eavesdropping to
a short period of time (an average of three minutes). Still, the Court ruled that
this action by the executive required prior judicial authorization-the issuance
of a warrant by a detached and neutral magistrate. 1
In insisting upon a warrant, the Court was driven by an understanding that
conceived of the diffusion of powers among the various branches of govern-
ment as a way of protecting freedom. It also drew upon the established rules
governing intrusions into the home, long thought of as the citadel of privacy.
The warrant had to identify the target of the tap with particularity. It also had to
be based on an application that gave, under oath, the reasons for believing that
the individual had committed, was committing, or was about to commit a
crime."
50. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
51. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
52. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
53. 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
54. Id. at 358 (majority opinion).
55. Id. at 356-57.
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The Court in Katz carefully noted the banal character of the case under
consideration. It involved the prosecution of an individual who was charged
with participating in a gambling ring. The Court distinguished such a case from
one involving issues of national security and specifically declined, in the penul-
timate footnote, to say whether warrants would be necessary in such cases. As
the Court put it, "Whether safeguards other than prior authorization by a magi-
strate would satisfy the Fourth Amendment in a situation involving the national
security is a question not presented by this case." "
In 1968, soon after the Katz decision, Congress, moved by a spirited public
campaign to get tough on crime, passed the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act.57 In Title III of that measure, Congress established rules governing
wiretapping. It faithfully endorsed the Katz requirements and prescribed the
procedures for obtaining warrants for wiretapping. Yet it ended with a provi-
so-so similar to the Katz footnote-that declared that nothing in the measure
should be read as requiring a warrant in national security cases. 8 The proviso
specifically identified two situations that were exempted by the warrant re-
quirements of the statute. One such situation arises when the President is seek-
ing to protect against attack or other hostile acts of a foreign power, safeguard
national security information against foreign intelligence activities, or obtain
foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United
States. The other situation covered by the proviso arises when the President is
trying to protect against clear and present dangers to the structure or existence
of the government.
The dialectic between the Court and Congress took yet another turn in 1972
when, in the so called Keith case, 9 the Court was called upon to consider this
proviso of the 1968 Act. By this time the Warren Court had begun to disinte-
grate, although a new institution had not fully come into being. The majority
decision was written by Justice Powell, who had recently been appointed to the
Court by President Richard Nixon. Another new Nixon appointee, Justice
Blackmun, joined his opinion, as did four who had supported Katz-Justices
Douglas, Brennan, Marshall, and Stewart, who had written the majority opi-
nion in Katz. The case arose from the radical politics engendered by widespread
opposition to the Vietnam War and appeared on the Court's docket, "at a
time," as Justice Powell acknowledged, "of worldwide ferment and ... civil dis-
orders.""o
Three individuals were charged with participating in a conspiracy to de-
stroy government property. One of the three was also charged with blowing up
56. Id. at 358 n.23.
57. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat.
197 (codified in scattered sections of5, 18, and 42 U.S.C. (2012)).
58. Id. § 2511.
59. United States v. U. S. District Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
60. Id. at 319.
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a CIA office in Ann Arbor, Michigan. In response to a pretrial motion by this
individual, the Attorney General filed an affidavit in which he acknowledged
that federal officials had intercepted telephone conversations in which the ac-
cused had participated. The Attorney General also acknowledged that these
wiretaps were not authorized by a warrant, although he went on to insist that
the interception was a reasonable exercise of the President's power to protect
national security and that a warrant was not required for such interceptions.
Justice Powell began his analysis by putting Title III to one side. The provi-
so exempted the Attorney General from the general requirements of the statute
in national security cases but was not a grant of authority. According to Justice
Powell, the proviso left the Attorney General where it found him-that is, sub-
ject to the Fourth Amendment. Yet the Court, recall, had declined in Katz to
resolve how the Fourth Amendment applies to national security cases. Justice
Powell offered a partial answer to this question by drawing a distinction, argua-
bly suggested by the proviso in Title III, between threats to national security
posed by "domestic organizations"-which he referred to throughout his opi-
nion as "domestic security matters"-and to threats to national security posed
by "foreign powers or their agents."" He defined domestic organizations to re-
fer to "a group or organization (whether formally or informally constituted)
composed of citizens of the United States and which has no significant connec-
tion with a foreign power, its agents or agencies."" He then applied the Fourth
Amendment warrant requirement to "domestic security matters," as he charac-
terized the case before him. In a manner reminiscent of Katz, however, he also
declared that he was expressing no opinion "on the scope of the President's sur-
veillance powers with respect to the activities of foreign powers, within or with-
out this country.""
The 1978 FISA statute sought to fill the decisional space left by the Court
first in Katz and then narrowed in Keith. The statute established a procedure
that required the Attorney General to apply to a special court for permission or
authorization to intercept telephone calls-both domestic and international-
that were being transmitted through facilities located in the United States. This
prior court approval requirement of FISA should not, however, be confused
with the warrant requirement that had been imposed by the Court in Katz and
Keith. FISA did not require, as those two decisions had, that the government set
forth reasons for believing that the target of the tap is guilty of a crime. The
government need only set forth reasons for believing that the target of the sur-
veillance is an agent or employee of a foreign power and that the interception is
likely to secure foreign intelligence, which, recall, is broadly defined by the sta-
tute as information that could be, but need not be, related to criminal activity
such as sabotage or international terrorism. By the terms of the statute, foreign
61. Id. at 321-22.
62. Id. at 309 n.8.
63. Id. at 308.
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intelligence may also relate to alleged clandestine intelligence activities or the
conduct of foreign affairs.
As a result of the 1978 statute, a dual structure emerged for wiretapping.
Some taps required warrants based on probable cause; others, those specifically
designed to gather foreign intelligence, did not. Remarkably, to this day-
almost thirty-five years later-the Supreme Court has not ruled on the consti-
tutionality of the FISA scheme or the dual structure it created. Yet a number of
lower courts upheld the statute.1 Those courts then faced a new quandary:
could the transcript of a telephone conversation obtained through FISA proce-
dures be admitted into evidence in criminal prosecutions?
These courts could have held that the probable cause requirement of Katz
and Keith had to be satisfied whenever the result of a wiretap was to be intro-
duced in a criminal prosecution. They chose, however, a more permissive rule
and defined that rule in terms of the purpose of the interception. As long as the
primary purpose of the tap was to gather foreign intelligence, the government
could use the less demanding FISA procedures for obtaining court permission
and then use the results of that interception in a criminal prosecution against
the target of that tap even though that permission was not based upon a show-
ing of probable cause as understood by Katz and Keith.6 5
This ruling lessened the force of the standards that the Supreme Court had
enunciated in Katz and Keith, a trend that continued with a statute passed in
the immediate wake of the September ii attacks-the USA PATRIOT Act.66
That measure provided that foreign intelligence gathering only had to be a sig-
nificant, as opposed to a primary, purpose of the interception in order for the
less demanding FISA procedures to govern. As a practical matter, this enabled
the government to avoid the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement as un-
derstood by Katz and Keith whenever it could show a reason to believe that the
target of the interception was an agent of a foreign power and that foreign intel-
ligence would be gathered by the interception. Gathering foreign intelligence
could be a significant or substantial purpose of the tap, and thus legitimate un-
der the less demanding FISA procedures, even if the primary purpose of the in-
terception was to gather evidence for a criminal prosecution.
IV. THE TERMS OF THE 2008 FISA AMENDMENTS
The 2008 amendments preserved the changes to FISA effectuated by the
PATRIOT Act. The government need only show that the gathering of foreign
64. See, e.g., United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Ni-
cholson, 955 F. Supp. 588 (E.D. Va. 1997).
65. See, e.g., United States v. Pelton, 835 F.2d 1067, 1075-76 (4 th Cir. 1987).
66. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required To
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-
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intelligence is a significant, as opposed to a primary, purpose of the wiretap.
The 2008 statute also continued the original FISA requirements for authorizing
wiretaps in which the target is a person located in the United States. In these
cases, the government must, in addition to the significant-purpose showing, es-
tablish a reason for believing that the target is an agent or employee of a foreign
power. However, the 20o8 statute introduced a further complexity in the FISA
structure by establishing, as the Bush Administration proposed, a special set of
rules to apply when the target of the tap is located outside the United States.
Some of these persons abroad may be Americans or, in the language of the
statute, "United States persons," a category defined to consist of United States
citizens and persons lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United
States.' With respect to them, as with Americans within the United States, the
requirements for surveillance are in accord with the original FISA statute as
amended by the PATRIOT Act. The government must establish that a signifi-
cant purpose of the tap is to gather foreign intelligence and that the individual is
an agent or employee of a foreign power. These requirements apply regardless
of whether the interception is effectuated through facilities located in the Unit-
ed States or through facilities located abroad.
However, in the case of non-United States persons-in my terms, foreign-
ers-who are located abroad, the 2008 statute radically departs from the origi-
nal FISA standards. As under the original statute, there is no need to obtain au-
thorization of any kind from a FISA judge when the wiretap does not require
access to facilities located in the United States." When, however, the tap aimed
at foreigners abroad requires access to facilities in the United States, permission
by a FISA judge is required, but the traditional FISA standard is drastically lo-
wered. Although the government must state that a significant purpose of the tap
is to gather foreign intelligence, little more is required. The government need
not have reason to suspect that the targets of the tap are agents or employees of
a foreign power, only that they are foreigners and that they are located outside
the United States.6 9
The 2008 Act not only lowers the standards for authorizing wiretaps aimed
at specific or individual foreigners abroad. It also facilitates the issuance of
"blanket" authorizations for taps of such persons, as the original TSP did.70
Even though the entire FISA procedure is secretive, the 20o8 Act relieves the
67. See FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, § 701, 122 Stat. 2436, 2437
(codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1881 (2012)).
68. 50 U.S.C. § 1802(a)(1) (2012).
69. Id. § 1881a(a)-(g).
70. See William C. Banks, Programmatic Surveillance and FISA: Of Needles in Hays-
tacks, 18 TEX. L. REV. 1633, 1635 (2010) ("The [20o8 statute] codified a procedure
to permit broad, programmatic surveillance focused on patterns of suspicious ac-
tivities and not on a specific individual or the contents of their communications
through changes in FISA that overcame the case-specific orientation of the origi-
nal statute.").
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government of the need to disclose to a FISA judge the identity of each individ-
ual to be targeted. It only requires that the government describe and employ
procedures reasonably designed to ensure that its proposed surveillance activity
will only target foreigners abroad.7' Arguably, this might permit the government
to obtain authorization from a FISA judge to tap the telephone calls of an entire
group of foreigners abroad (e.g., "persons suspected of links with Al Qaeda" or
"high-ranking officers of the Pakistani army").
All applications for warrants, even those required by Katz and Keith, are
considered by a judge without notice to the target. The hope is that a judge, act-
ing on his own, will scrutinize the factual basis of the application. This hope ar-
guably persisted even under the original FISA scheme, though two of its fea-
tures lessened the likelihood of that hope ever being realized-the judges on the
FISA court are handpicked by the Chief Justice and assured a degree of ano-
nymity. But the 2008 Act went further and sought to eliminate the powers of a
FISA judge to challenge the factual predicates of the government's application
for authorization for a wiretap where the target is a foreigner abroad.
In 2004, Congress passed a statute establishing the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence to coordinate and oversee the work of all of the intelli-
gence-gathering agencies of the United States.7 ' This statute also amended the
original FISA statute to require that those applications that had to be jointly au-
thorized by the Director of the CIA and the Attorney General now had to be au-
thorized by the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General.73
The 2008 FISA amendments continued this requirement of joint authorization
by the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence. These offi-
cials must jointly establish a plan for governing these surveillance activities
aimed at foreigners abroad, submit that plan to the FISA judge, and certify that
the new FISA requirements for such targets are met.75 In another radical depar-
ture from the original FISA scheme, the 2008 statute goes on to provide that the
judge must approve the application if the certification "contains all the required
elements."7' There is no room for the judge to scrutinize, as he might or should
have done in the past, the factual predicates of the government's FISA applica-
tion. The 20o8 statute also places a strict limit-thirty days-on the time the
FISA judge has to consider the application."
Having minimized the role of the judiciary, the 2008 statute provides for a
measure of after-the-fact review of the surveillance activities of the Department
71. 50 U.S.C. § 188ia(a)-(g).
72. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Protection Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458,
118 Stat. 3638 (codified in scattered sections of42 and 50 U.S.C. (2012)).
73. Id. § 1o71(e).
74. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(a).
75. Id. § 1881a(a)-(g).
76. Id. § 1881a(i)(3).
77. Id. § 1881a(i)(1)(B).
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of Justice and the various intelligence agencies that might be engaged in wire-
tapping. This review power was entrusted to a bevy of inspectors general, who
on any account are administrative officials, not detached and impartial magi-
strates. Inspectors general are appointed by the President and subject to remov-
al by him. The Senate must confirm their appointment and be given thirty days
notice of their removal." They were created by a 1978 statute, also a response to
the disclosures of the Church committee, and were charged with reporting to
Congress and the executive on the practices of the administrative agencies to
which they are assigned. The 2008 FISA amendments specifically instructed the
Inspector General of the Department of Justice and his counterpart in each of
the intelligence agencies involved in the surveillance to review and report on the
extent to which the surveillance targets persons ultimately determined to have
been located in the country, and the extent to which the surveillance produces
intelligence reports that identify Americans.79
V. THE CONFLICT WITH THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The constitutional protection of privacy is not absolute. The Fourth
Amendment does not altogether deny the government access to the informa-
tion that it needs to discharge its elemental duty to secure the land. Rather, it
seeks to minimize or avoid the dangers inherent in surveillance by restricting
the techniques and methods that the government may employ to acquire that
information. It places a zone around domains and activities of the individual-
those endowed with a "reasonable expectation of privacy" 8o-and then con-
structs a barrier to protect this zone. This barrier is reinforced by the under-
standing that each intrusion not only impairs the individual's interest in privacy
and thus undermines the conditions necessary for human flourishing, but also
may, given the particular circumstances of the intrusion and the reasons for it,
threaten a multitude of other interests, including those protected by the consti-
tutional guarantees of free speech, fair trial, and equal treatment.
The 2008 FISA amendments are a grant of authority. They allow the gov-
ernment to intercept telephone conversations and thus to interfere with an ac-
tivity most certainly endowed with a reasonable expectation of privacy. The va-
lidity of the statute turns on the conditions it imposes on the exercise of this
authority and whether those conditions are stringent enough to comport with
the Fourth Amendment and the barriers it interposes against such intrusions of
privacy. Typically, the Fourth Amendment has been used to review criminal
convictions, and in that context constitutes a standard to measure the investiga-
tory activity of law enforcement officials. It also has been held to establish a
standard to measure legislative grants of investigative authority and the power
78. Inspector General Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C.A. App. 3 (2010).
79. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(1)(2).
8o. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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of government officials to engage in various forms of surveillance, including
wiretapping."'
A. The Probable Cause Requirement
The barrier constructed by Katz and Keith has two features. It requires
court approval prior to the interception and it conditions that approval upon a
showing of probable cause. FISA-as originally enacted and as amended-
satisfies the first requirement of prior court approval. But it qualifies in impor-
tant ways the second-the need to show probable cause."2
The Fourth Amendment does not elaborate on the meaning of probable
cause, but, as Katz and Keith and countless other cases declared, probable cause
is, as used in the Fourth Amendment, a technical term linked to criminality. It
does not simply mean reason to believe, but rather reason to believe that the
person whose calls are being intercepted had committed a crime, is committing
a crime, or is about to commit a crime. 83
The burden of showing probable cause may weigh heavily on the govern-
ment. The government may sometimes need to wiretap in order to acquire the
information that will enable it to identify a criminal, or give it reason to believe
that an individual is about to commit a crime. The same could be said about
81. For example, in Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967), the Supreme Court over-
turned a bribery conviction based on evidence obtained without a warrant that
met the Fourth Amendment standards of particularity. The Court also declared
unconstitutional on its face the New York statute that established the scheme go-
verning electronic surveillance under which the warrant was issued for failing to
include a sufficient particularity requirement.
82. Some have suggested that FISA's qualification of the probable cause requirement
does not go far enough, and that further qualification or even elimination of that
requirement would improve the statute (or replacement legislation). See, e.g.,
Stephanie Cooper Blum, What Really Is at Stake with the FISA Amendments Act of
2008 and Ideas for Future Surveillance Reform, 18 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 269, 291-94,
308-12 (2009).
83. A contrary understanding of the related term "individualized suspicion" recently
surfaced in footnote 2 of Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court in Ashcroft v. Al-
Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011), a case that involved an arrest under the federal materi-
al witness statute. In her concurrence, Justice Ginsburg argued that the "individu-
alized suspicion" needed for a warrant is a legal term of art that means suspicion
of wrongdoing. Id. at 2088 n.3 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Justice Scalia, however,
used the term more loosely and concluded that the material witness warrant in
the case had been properly based on "individualized suspicion" that the target
possessed relevant information about others. Id. at 2082 n.2. He said: "No usage of
the word is more common and idiomatic than a statement such as 'I have a suspi-
cion he knows something about the crime,' or even 'I have a suspicion she is
throwing me a surprise birthday party."' Id. No authority was offered in support
of the view-so odd for an originalist-that this contemporary or idiomatic usage
was intended by the Framers in the Fourth Amendment context.
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intrusions into the home. They may be needed to establish probable cause.
However, under the Fourth Amendment, that information must be secured by
means that do not entail intercepting a conversation or intruding into a domain
that is endowed with a reasonable expectation of privacy. In Katz and again in
Keith, the Supreme Court stopped short of applying this understanding of
probable cause to wiretapping aimed at gathering foreign intelligence and re-
served that question for another day-a day that has not yet come.
As a purely predictive matter, it is difficult to say that the Court will take
the additional step and apply to FISA wiretaps-either as originally enacted in
1978 or amended in 2008-the understanding of probable cause announced in
Katz and Keith. The present Court might even, on the worst of days, overrule
those decisions. But my inquiry is not predictive, but rather normative - what
would a fair-minded lawyer, acting as a member of civil society, say? From that
perspective, the additional step seems necessary. It is difficult to understand
how the term "probable cause" could be given different meanings depending on
the type of information sought, the purpose of the government in seeking this
information, or the citizenship and location of the person who is the target of
the interception.
The 2008 statute varies the conditions for obtaining court approval de-
pending on the purpose of the surveillance and the citizenship and location of
the target, though in no instance does it require the suspicion of criminality that
is the essence of probable cause. In all FISA wiretaps, the government must
show that a significant purpose-not the only purpose, nor even the primary
purpose-of the interception is to gather foreign intelligence, which of course
may have no connection to any suspected criminal activity.4 The statute im-
poses a further condition on obtaining court approval when the target of the
tap is an American citizen or a person who is lawfully in the United States: the
government must show that the target is an employee or agent of a foreign
power." If the foreign power is an international terrorist organization, it can be
fairly assumed that there is reason to believe that the target is a terrorist and
thus that the probable cause requirement has been satisfied. But wiretapping is
allowed under FISA even if the foreign power is another nation, for example the
United Kingdom or Saudi Arabia, and there is thus no reason to suspect the
target of criminal activity.
There is an even more striking departure from the requirements of proba-
ble cause when the target is a foreigner abroad. In those cases, there is no need
to show even that the target is an employee or agent of a foreign power, only
that he or she is a foreigner abroad. Moreover, in these cases, the FISA judge is
denied the capacity, present in any probable cause hearing, of scrutinizing the
factual basis of the government's application. On top of that, the 20o8 amend-
ments authorize a FISA judge to approve "blanket" wiretaps aimed at groups or
categories of persons consisting of foreigners abroad-once again sharply at va-
84. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
85. Id. § 703 (codified at 5o U.S.C. § 1881b).
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riance with the constitutional concept of probable cause, which requires suspi-
cion of criminality and thus must, of necessity, proceed on an individual or per-
son-by-person basis.
Soon after the enactment of the 20o8 FISA amendments, a lawsuit-the
one now before the Supreme Court on the issue of standing-was filed chal-
lenging the statute. The lawsuit was designed to focus attention on the provi-
sions of that statute regarding foreigners abroad-and with good reason. Those
provisions mark the clearest and most disturbing departure from the Fourth
Amendment's probable cause requirement. Yet in fashioning these provisions,
President Bush and Congress may have been relying on a 1990 decision of the
Supreme Court, United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,"6 which arguably could
have been read as placing foreigners abroad in a constitutional free fall.
In that case, Chief Justice Rehnquist denied the protection of the Fourth
Amendment to a Mexican citizen who had been forcibly taken to the United
States to stand trial on drug charges and whose home in Mexico had been
searched by United States drug enforcement officials without a warrant. Ac-
cording to Rehnquist, the Fourth Amendment-and perhaps the entire Bill of
Rights-provides no protection to persons lacking a voluntary connection to
the United States and thus did not govern in any way the search of the Mexican
citizen's home in Mexico.7 In saying this, Rehnquist sought to repudiate the
understanding that prevailed during the Warren Court era that viewed the Con-
stitution as imposing restraints on American officials wherever they acted and
independent of the target of their actions. 8 This understanding was based on a
generous reading of the 1957 decision of the Supreme Court in Reid v. Covert,89
which Rehnquist went out of his way to discredit and overrule.9 o
Rehnquist's opinion was denominated the "Opinion of the Court," but it
needed Justice Kennedy's support to achieve that status. Justice Kennedy, then a
relatively new appointee, wrote a separate opinion in which he said that he
joined the Chief Justice's opinion but in fact advanced a more cosmopolitan
conception of the Constitution.9 ' He brushed to one side Rehnquist's emphasis
upon the prefatory words of the Fourth Amendment-"the right of the
people." 92 According to Kennedy, those words were nothing more than a rhe-
torical flourish, a way of emphasizing the importance of what was to follow ra-
ther than a means of restricting to Americans the protection of the right guar-
anteed. Kennedy conceded that it would be impractical to require federal
86. 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
87. Id. at 274-75.
88. See Owen Fiss, The War Against Terrorism and the Rule of Law, 26 O.J.L.S. 235
(2006).
89. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
90. Verdugo- Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 269-70.
91. Id. at 275 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
92. Id. at 276-77.
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officials acting abroad to be subject to the same requirements as imposed on
them when they are acting within the United States. For that reason, they are
not, according to Kennedy, subject to the warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment." On the other hand, he continued, they are always subject to the
obligation to act fairly or, in the framework of the Fourth Amendment, "rea-
sonably."9 4 Kennedy concurred in Rehnquist's outcome, but only because he
felt that the federal officials had in fact acted reasonably.
Similar strains of pragmatic cosmopolitanism might be found in Justice
Kennedy's opinion, this time for the majority, in the 2008 decision in Boume-
diene v. Bush." In this case, Kennedy declared unconstitutional a provision of a
federal statute (the Military Commissions Act of 20o6) that was applied to deny
access to the writ of habeas corpus to foreign nationals being detained in Guan-
tAnamo. He concluded that the statute constituted an unlawful suspension of
the writ of habeas corpus. In so doing, he repudiated an effort by Congress,
similar to the one embodied in the 2008 FISA amendments, to free the execu-
tive engaged in a War on Terror from constitutional constraints on its treat-
ment of foreign nationals located abroad, though in this instance by denying
them access to the writ of habeas corpus to test the legality of their detention.
On the surface of his opinion, Kennedy appears to have been moved less by a
regard for the rights of the prisoners than one for separation of powers-the
need to preserve the capacity of the judiciary to review the legality of executive
detentions. Yet the consequence of his action for the rights of Guantdnamo
prisoners-all foreign nationals detained abroad-was manifest and thus the
Boumediene decision can also be read as extending the reach of the Constitution
to foreigners abroad.
We need not, however, enter into the debates generated by these readings
of Justice Kennedy's opinions, for even if we adopt Chief Justice Rehnquist's
position in Verdugo-Urquidez and restrict the protection of the Fourth
Amendment in the way he suggests, there is good and sufficient reason to be
concerned with the surveillance authority granted the executive by the 20o8 sta-
tute over telephone calls of foreigners abroad. Americans may well be parties to
those calls and the interception of those calls will interfere with their reasonable
expectation of privacy. In my view, the focus should not be restricted to the tar-
get of the interception, but rather should embrace all the parties to the conver-
sation.
The 2008 amendments require court authorization of a tap aimed at fo-
reigners abroad only when the interception entails access to facilities located in
the United States. Although sometimes a conversation between two foreigners
located abroad may be routed through facilities in the United States, this is rare.
Presumably, the bulk of international telephone calls routed through the United
States involve at least one party who is in the United States. Some of these per-
93. Id. at 277-78.
94. Id.
95. 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
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sons may be transitory visitors or even persons in the country illegally and thus
beyond the protection of Rehnquist's Fourth Amendment. But more likely than
not, they will be United States citizens or persons lawfully granted residence in
the United States-persons who had the voluntary connection to the United
States that Rehnquist demanded in Verdugo-Urquidez.
Accordingly, a wiretap authorized by a FISA judge that is aimed at a foreign
national living abroad will, in all likelihood, give the government access to pri-
vate conversations of persons unquestionably entitled to the protection of the
Fourth Amendment. This is indeed true of the plaintiffs in the standing case
now before the Supreme Court-journalists, lawyers, and human rights re-
searchers whose work necessitates frequent and regular telephone calls to
people in the Middle East. These individuals may not in fact be the target of the
surveillance and, for that reason, may be characterized, as a purely technical
matter, as incidental victims of the surveillance, but there can be no mistake
that they are victims of the surveillance. Just as much of their personal or pri-
vate information may be acquired as that of foreign nationals living abroad.
They will be fearful of speaking fully and freely or may be discouraged from us-
ing the phone altogether.
Admittedly, in the ordinary law enforcement context, probable cause must
be shown for the target, but not for all the parties to the conversation. State-
ments by anyone who engages in a telephone conversation with the target might
be used by the government in a criminal prosecution.96 The 2008 FISA amend-
ments might be viewed as following a similar rule, but in truth the dangers are
much greater. The target of the interception need not be an individual; it might
consist of groups or categories of foreign nationals, and there is no need to es-
tablish, with respect to the target, the probable cause contemplated by Katz or
Keith. The government need only give reasons for believing a target is a foreign-
er located abroad and that a significant purpose of the interception is to gather
foreign intelligence. The threshold for interception is thereby lowered dramati-
cally and, as a consequence, the so-called incidental victims-United States citi-
zens or lawful permanent residents of the United States-are more exposed
than ever to interceptions of their private conversations.
In criticizing the 2008 amendments and perhaps the 1978 FISA scheme in
general for failure to abide by the probable cause requirement of the Fourth
96. See, e.g., United States v. Perillo, 333 F. Supp. 914, 919-21 (D. Del. 1971) (citing Al-
derman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 175 n.io (1969)) (deeming constitutional the
government's use of conversations between the target of surveillance and a third
party in a subsequent criminal prosecution of the third party, where the surveil-
lance was conducted pursuant to a warrant applying only to the target of surveil-
lance and the government had made no prior probable cause showing regarding
the third party); see also United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 157 (1974) (holding
that the government's interception of incriminating telephone calls by the wife of
a target of surveillance, and the subsequent use of those calls in a criminal prose-
cution against the wife, did not violate the Fourth Amendment even though the
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Amendment, I am making little-perhaps too little-of the considered judg-
ment of Congress and the President over the meaning of that crucial term. It is
difficult, however, to endow the decisions of the President and Congress with
the normative force that derives from our democratic commitments and for
that reason defer to their judgment. Probable cause is a technical term and the
meaning that the political branches have given to it can only be found in long
and complicated statutes not easily accessible or understood by the general pub-
lic, or maybe even by their representatives. Moreover, the burden of the FISA
scheme-dilution or abrogation of the probable cause requirement-is in large
part, though not entirely, shouldered by persons who are not entitled to partici-
pate in the electoral process. This is particularly true of the 2008 statute and its
grant of authority to target the telephone calls of foreigners located abroad.
Granted, the President and Congress are coordinate branches of government
also charged with the duty of giving concrete meaning to the Constitution. But
they are not bound by the strictures of public reason-above all, the rule re-
quiring judgment based on principle-that gives the judiciary the authority to
interpret the Constitution and, if need be, to override the interpretations of the
political branches.97
B. The "Special Needs" Exception
The Fourth Amendment has an unusual grammatical structure. As Justice
Kennedy's concurrence in Verdugo- Urquidez makes evident, the Amendment
consists of two clauses. The first clause proclaims the right of the people to be
protected against unreasonable searches and seizures.9 The second, joined to
the first by the word "and," sets forth the requirements for warrants.99 Some
scholars have advanced a disjunctive reading of the two clauses, arguing that in
the minds of the Framers, the Warrant Clause sought to limit the availability of
warrants, not to make their issuance decisive in determining whether an inter-
ception is, within the meaning of the first clause, reasonable.' The possession
of a valid warrant, the argument goes, would provide an absolute defense for a
97. See Owen Fiss, Between Supremacy and Exclusivity, in THE LEAST EXAMINED
BRANCH: THE ROLE OF LEGISLATURES IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATE 452, 452-67
(Richard W. Bauman & Tsvi Kahana eds., 20o6).
98. U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated . . . .").
99. Id. ("[A]nd no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the per-
sons or things to be seized.").
ioo. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
FIRST PRINCIPLES 31-45 (1998); Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Prin-
ciples, 107 HARv. L. REV. 757, 762, 774 (1994). But see Carol S. Steiker, Second
Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARv. L. REV. 820 (1994).
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government official subsequently accused of conducting an unreasonable
search. By tightly prescribing the requirements of a valid warrant, the Fourth
Amendment sought to limit the issuance of warrants-and, correspondingly,
the availability of an absolute defense-for unreasonable searches.
This understanding of the Warrant Clause may indeed be a plausible ac-
count of the historic origins of this provision, but even so, it does not undercut
the now-ancient rule-affirmed by Katz and Keith in the context of wiretap-
ping-requiring that if at all possible the government seek a warrant before
conducting a search, and further that the warrant be issued only if certain re-
quirements-including the showing of probable cause-are satisfied. Indeed,
this rule may well be a fair implication from the bar on the defensive use of war-
rants that do not meet the specified standards. Liability rules often reflect an
understanding of best practices.
In Katz itself, the Court acknowledged two very narrow exceptions to the
warrant requirement: one for searches conducted in the course of an arrest, and
the other for searches conducted in "hot pursuit" of a suspected criminal."o' The
Court concluded that neither exception was applicable to wiretapping and
showed no inclination to create another exception.102 In recent decades, howev-
er, the number of cases in which an exception to the warrant requirement has
been made-the most familiar involves the searches of passengers and their
luggage at airports'o3-has grown. These exceptions are now grouped under the
heading of "special needs"0 4 and have typically been justified on the ground
that the intrusion of privacy is momentary, obtaining a warrant before the
search is not remotely practical, and redress of abuses of power may be obtained
through an action for damages.
These conditions are clearly not satisfied by FISA wiretaps. Such surveil-
lance is not a momentary intrusion, but lasts for a considerable period of time.
Under the 2008 amendments, for example, the tap can last for a year.0 5 Nor can
it be claimed that obtaining a warrant prior to the surveillance is a practical im-
possibility.o6 In contrast to airport searches, the 2008 statute requires the gov-
ioi. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357-58 (1967).
102. Id.
103. See, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 499-500 (2d Cir. 1974).
104. Justice Blackmun introduced the phrase in New Jersey v. T.L. 0., 469 U.S. 325> 351
(1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment). See also MacWade v. Kelly,
460 F.3d 260, 268 (2d Cir. 20o6) (acknowledging that United States v. Edwards ex-
emplifies what later came to be known as the "special needs exception").
105. 50 U.S.C. i881a(a) (2012).
106. Although the Attorney General and Director of National Intelligence must ordi-
narily wait for a judicial order before authorizing surveillance, the 2oo8 FISA
amendments permit the institution of a wiretap without a judicial order where the
Attorney General and Director determine that "exigent circumstances" exist. Id.
§ 1881a(c)(2); see also id. § 1881a(a) (granting the Attorney General and Director
the ability to authorize surveillance). In such cases, the Attorney General and Di-
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ernment to first seek judicial approval of the interception o7-the only issue is
what must be shown to obtain that permission. Moreover, given the secrecy re-
quirements of FISA interceptions, a retroactive action for damages for abuses of
executive power is not a viable alternative. Secrecy is no bar to the work of the
inspectors general, but they are only administrative officials and their task is to
report on whether the practices of the executive comported with the statutory
requirements, not with the constitutional standard of probable cause or any of
its cognates. Their job is not to provide a remedy for such abuses, but rather to
report to the executive and Congress on the extent to which surveillance has
targeted or led to intelligence reports mentioning persons in the United States.
Under Title III, the government is required to give all subjects of a wiretap
notice of an interception after the surveillance is complete. There is no such no-
tice requirement in FISA. In the standing case now before the Supreme Court,
the government indicated that individuals would be provided notice of an in-
terception when the government intends to use that interception as part of a
criminal prosecution."os Although the terms and conditions of that notice re-
main unclear to me, let us assume that as a result of this promised notice an in-
dividual might, now and then, learn that he or she had been the subject of a
FISA tap. Then that individual might be able to demonstrate in a subsequent
action for damages that the surveillance was undertaken for the worst of rea-
sons, for example, to make life difficult for a political enemy or to learn of the
accused's strategy in an ongoing criminal prosecution.
But this imagined scenario hardly lives up to one of the assumptions under-
lying the special needs exception: namely, that a retrospective action for damag-
es might hold the government accountable and thus avoid unreasonable in-
fringements of privacy. The receipt of the promised notice for a FISA tap is
likely to be a rare and isolated event, available only if a criminal prosecution is
launched against the individual. In any event, such notice does not adequately
guard against the principal harm of wiretapping-the fear of being heard by
others. This fear might limit conversations, or discourage them altogether,
which would be a tremendous loss for the individual and impair the democratic
character of society, though it is not likely to be a sufficient basis for an action
for damages.
rector must submit a certification for the interception within seven days of its
commencement, if such a certification is not already pending. Id. § 1881a(g)(1)(B).
107. Id. § 1881a(g)(1)(A).
io8. Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA (Oct. 29, 2012)
(No. 11-1025), http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral-arguments/argument tran
scripts/11-1025.pdf (remarks of Solicitor Gen. Donald Verrilli, Jr.) ("Your Honor,
under the statute, there are two clear examples of situations in which the individ-
uals would have standing. The first is if an aggrieved person, someone who is a
party to a communication, gets notice that the government intends to introduce
information in a proceeding against them."); see also id. at 42-43-
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C. Extraordinary Crimes and the Problem of Overbreadth
In an era that began with the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the
temptation is great to develop special rules for surveillance activities aimed at
preventing further terrorist attacks. These rules would free the government
from the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement and might be justified in
terms of the magnitude or severity of the harm to be avoided. They might be
understood as an expansion of the special needs exception, which is premised
on the disjunctive reading of the two clauses of the Fourth Amendment that
makes reasonableness the touchstone of legality. The test is not whether the
surveillance is authorized by a warrant showing probable cause, but rather
whether the government's action is unreasonable. In a recent case, United States
v. Jones,o' Justice Alito suggested yet another way of conceptualizing these spe-
cial rules, though the result would be the same-no warrant would be required.
For Alito, the Fourth Amendment does not protect privacy, but only a reasona-
ble expectation of privacy and the severity of the harm to be avoided would en-
ter into the judgment as to whether there was a violation of that expectation."o
When investigating extraordinary offenses, there may be, according to Alito, no
intrusion of a reasonable expectation of privacy, and thus no warrant would be
required."'
In the Jones case, the police had installed a GPS (Global Positioning Sys-
tem) tracking device in the undercarriage of a suspect's car without first obtain-
ing an adequate warrant. The device was used to track the vehicle's movement
over the next twenty-eight days." 2 Justice Scalia wrote the opinion for the Court
and in it he applied a methodology reminiscent of Chief Justice Taft's decision
in Olmstead. Scalia first said that the car was an "effect" within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment and then concluded that the act of installing the GPS
device constituted a trespass and thus was a "search" or "seizure" within the
meaning of that Amendment."3 Justice Alito wrote a special concurrence in
which he disassociated himself from Justice Scalia's mode of analysis. Con-
demning the police practice within the framework of Katz, Alito maintained
that the police had violated a reasonable expectation of privacy and thus were
required to obtain an appropriate warrant authorizing the surveillance." 4
In insisting upon such a warrant, Justice Alito emphasized the length of the
surveillance-twenty-eight days."' He thought that relatively short-term moni-
toring of a person's movement on a public street might be in accord with "ex-
109. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
11o. Id. at 957-64 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
in. Id.
n2 Id. at 948 (majority opinion).
n3. Id. at 949-53.
114. Id. at 958, 964 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
115. Id. at 964.
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pectations of privacy that our society has recognized as reasonable."" In restat-
ing this conclusion, however, Alito also made the nature of the offense relevant
for determining whether there was interference with a reasonable expectation of
privacy and thus whether a warrant was necessary. As he put it: "the use of
longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on ex-
pectations of privacy.""' In saying this, Justice Alito appears to contemplate a
special rule for exceptional or extraordinary offenses. Mindful of the novelty of
this approach, however, and perhaps in an effort to satisfy the other Justices
who joined his opinion-Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Kagan-he ended his
opinion with this disclaimer, so evocative of the national security disclaimer in
Katz and the foreign intelligence gathering disclaimer in Keith: "We also need
not consider whether prolonged GPS monitoring in the context of investiga-
tions involving extraordinary offenses would similarly intrude on a constitu-
tionally protected sphere of privacy.""'
The defendant in Jones was charged with drug trafficking-surely not an
extraordinary offense. Terrorist activities on the scale of the 9/11 attack or any
other acts of international terrorism may have that quality of extraordinariness
to which Justice Alito referred. My inclination, however, is to resist the tempta-
tion to allow an exception to the warrant requirement for so-called extraordi-
nary crimes, regardless of how the exception is formulated. It may be difficult to
identify the criteria needed to implement such a distinction, but my concern
with this approach runs deeper.
For one thing, I fear that an exception to the warrant requirement for ex-
traordinary crimes would be susceptible to great abuse. The government can
always claim that it is seeking to prevent an extraordinary crime and then de-
fend that claim on the basis of knowledge that it alone has. Even more, I fear the
jurisprudential consequences of such an approach. It would impair the authori-
ty and near-sacred quality of the Constitution as a charter establishing the
structure of government and defining the highest ideals of the nation. It would
also put judges into the business of making exceptions to a standard rule that is
not easily cabined and that is at odds with their obligation to say what the law
is. Pragmatic considerations often enter into judicial judgments, but never in a
way that permits disregard for a clearly established constitutional command or
interpretation.
However, even if Justice Alito has his way and an exception to the Fourth
Amendment warrant requirement were allowed for extraordinary offenses, it is
hard to see how it might save the 2008 statute, or even the FISA scheme in gen-
eral. These statutes, in contrast, say, to President Bush's Terrorist Surveillance
Program, are in no way limited to surveillance that is aimed at al Qaeda or asso-
ciated forces, or even international terrorism in general. As originally enacted,
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ternational terrorism and then defined foreign intelligence in a way to include
information about international terrorism. Yet the statute is not confined to
terrorism. In 2004, FISA was amended to include suspected terrorists who acted
on their own,"9 but that only broadened the reach of the statute.
In utilizing the powers granted by the 2oo8 statute, the Attorney General
may be guided by an understanding of the historical context in which the sta-
tute was enacted-it was passed during an era defined by the War on Terror,
and in essence sought to give legislative authorization for President Bush's Ter-
rorist Surveillance Program. Under these circumstances, the Attorney General
might well decide to use the grant of authority conferred on him only for the
purpose of preventing international terrorism or pursuing those who have en-
gaged in such terrorist activities. But we can never be sure of that. The FISA re-
gime-as originally enacted and amended in 2008-reaches more broadly and
thus exacts a toll on our freedom. The very existence of the statute gives rise to
the fear that international telephone calls will be tapped without the kind of
judicial scrutiny and authorization required by the Fourth Amendment.
In the context of the First Amendment and its guarantee of freedom of
speech, we have learned to judge statutes on their face-on the basis of all their
possible applications. Under the so-called overbreadth doctrine, the Court will
strike down statutes that arguably may have some constitutionally permissible
applications if there are a substantial number of applications that impinge on
activities that are concededly constitutionally protected. 2 o The Court will dec-
lare the statute invalid on its face as a way of enlarging the freedom of citizens
to participate in those activities that are constitutionally protected. Legislators
remain free to prohibit the activities that may be constitutionally unprotected,
but only in a way that narrowly targets those activities and thus economizes on
the sacrifice of First Amendment freedoms.
A similar doctrine needs to be recognized in the Fourth Amendment con-
text.m' In the First Amendment context, the overbreadth doctrine was an-
nounced as a protection against the chilling effect of a criminal statute. The
2oo8 Act as well as the original FISA statute is a grant of authority to the execu-
tive, not a criminal statute addressed to the citizenry, and yet such a grant of au-
thority may have the effect of discouraging-or chilling-the exercise of per-
sonal liberty, in this instance the liberty to engage in private telephone
conversations. Thus, even if Justice Alito's point is pursued-even if there are
some offenses that are so extraordinary that we may allow the government to
119. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2oo4, Pub. L. No. 108-458,
§ 6oo(a), n8 Stat. 3638, 3742 (codified as amended at 5o U.S.C. § 18oi(b)(i)(C)
(2012)).
120. See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
121. As discussed earlier, see supra note 81, the Supreme Court in Berger v. New York,
388 U.S. 41 (1967), declared unconstitutional a New York statute establishing a
process to obtain warrants allowing eavesdropping. The Court declared the sta-
tute invalid on its face and spoke of its "broad sweep," id. at 54, but did not for-
mally invoke the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine.
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investigate them without a warrant-the statute that permits or authorizes such
investigative activity must fall when it embraces as broad a category as "foreign
intelligence gathering." The legislators must go back to the drawing board and
come up with a statute confined to investigations related to international ter-
rorism. Then, but only then, will the Supreme Court have reason to decide
whether international terrorism is the kind of extraordinary offense that Justice
Alito contemplated and whether an investigation of such an offense justifies an
abandonment of the traditional warrant requirement of the Fourth Amend-
ment.
One branch of the principle requiring separation of powers warns against
unilateral exercises of executive power. From this perspective, the 20o8 statute,
compared to President Bush's Terrorist Surveillance Program, might be seen as
a step forward, or maybe a half-step. In it, the role of the judiciary is minimized
but Congress authorized what Bush had decreed. From the perspective of the
Fourth Amendment and the values it seeks to protect, however, the 2008 statute
is a step backward, for its authorization of warrantless wiretapping is in no way
confined to terrorism or to the investigation of any other offense that might
possibly be regarded as extraordinary. Like much of what has happened during
the last decade, such as the use of military commissions and prolonged, indefi-
nite imprisonment without a trial, the 2008 measure has transformed the excep-
tion into the rule. At the moment, the authority to engage in warrantless wire-
tapping is confined to the process of gathering foreign intelligence, broadly
construed, but if left unchecked, it will provide the foundation for a similar au-
thority in other realms and thus become, I fear, a new point of departure.
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